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Abstract 
This report provides an overview on the growing topic of social innovations. It summarises 
the main arguments and traces their discussion in the social sciences. In a first step, the paper 
focuses on the conceptual distinctions between social and technical innovations on the one 
hand, and between social innovation and social change on the other. From this point of 
departure, the second and central part of the paper addresses questions concerning the 
reflexive nature of social innovations as well as the referential structures used for evaluating 
social innovations in contemporary ‘innovation societies’. Based on this framework, the third 
and last part of the paper provides a brief overview of current social innovation initiatives and 
institutions at the EU level. The aim is to situate the concept of social innovations in a broader 
discussion of social and technical change, reflexive modernisation and emerging innovation 
societies today. 
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Social Innovations. Highly reflexive and multi-referential 
phenomena of today’s innovation society? 
 
A report on analytical concepts and a social science initiative 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Social innovations have become a popular topic in many societal areas, political fields and 
academic discourses (cf. Taylor 1970, Whyte 1982, Zapf 1989, Gillwald 2000, Mumford 
2002, Mulgan 2006, Phills Jr. et al. 2008, Howaldt/Jacobsen 2010, Nicholls/Murdock 2012). 
Despite this prosperity, many aspects of social innovations remain unclear (Howaldt/Schwarz 
2010). This report will engage with the concept of ‘social innovation’ along three specific 
lines of inquiry (two conceptual and one empirical) in order to situate social innovations 
against the backdrop of emerging ‘innovation societies’ (Hutter et al. 2011). The first line of 
discussion defines the term ‘social innovation’ in contrast to concepts of technical innovation 
and social change (sections 2 and 3). The second line bears on theoretical considerations of 
increasingly reflexive and multi-referential social innovations in modern societies (sections 4 
and 5). Last not least, the third line of discussion revolves around the growing interest in 
social innovations at the level of EU policy and funding, which is taken as an empirical 
example of the increasingly reflexive and multi-referential nature of social innovations 
(section 6). 
The first part of the report starts with a critique of the prevalent distinction between 
technical and social innovations (section 2). Generally, social innovations are thought to be 
less tangible than the artefacts of technical innovation: social innovations target the level of 
social practices, seeking to change established ways of conduct. This simple distinction 
between immaterial social innovations and tangible technical innovations will be challenged 
in the course of the paper. However, social innovations will remain the primary focal point. In 
addition to the social/technical divide, there are distinctly normative aspects of the term 
‘social innovation’. Social innovations are often characterised as having a positive value, of 
being ‘good’ or at least ‘better’, than what they replace. For some, they are also seen as 
fulfilling a specific function in modern societies: social innovations occur as bottom-up 
developments in contexts where bureaucratic planning or market processes fail. In this sense, 
social innovations are not only ‘good’, their origin is distinctly assigned to the civic sphere – 
in stark contrast to many technical innovations created in the political or economic realm. 
However, social innovations do resemble technical innovations in the sense that they are 
mindful and directed transformations, which sets them apart from larger and unplanned social 
change (section 3). Social innovations, it is argued, still are innovations and thus carry 
specific analytical meanings and normative connotations which are often conflated, but need 
to be distangled in order to understand the dynamics of an innovation society. 
                                                 
 This report was prepared for the Research Training Group Innovation Society Today. The Reflexive Creation of Novelty, 
funded by the German Research Council (DFG), http://www.innovation.tu-berlin.de. In this context, the paper 
draws from some literature that is currently only available in the German language. 
I am indebted to Sarah Matthews for providing skilful language counselling and to Michael Hutter and Werner 
Rammert for their critical input. 
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This discussion about the characteristics of social innovations is extended in the second and 
central part of the paper by an inquiry into what it means when social innovations are 
increasingly produced in a reflexive manner (section 4). The rise of programmes and 
initiatives that revolve around social innovation indicates that they may have become a widely 
recognised instrument of political or civic engagement. As innovation becomes a ubiquitous 
part of modern life, it also becomes an enduring aspect of social practices, which are then 
judged by whether they comply with society’s seemingly insatiable desire for novelty 
(Nowotny 2005). The problematic aspects of valuating and judging social innovations will 
then be discussed in terms of their multiple references (section 5). This discussion aims at 
providing a brief analytical perspective on the relationship between social innovations and 
distinctly modern forms of societal integration. Cross-identifying modernity with innovation 
poses some theoretical challenges, mainly the problem of explaining modernity in terms of 
innovation and vice versa, but these challenges will not be addressed here. Instead, the idea of 
a reflexive innovation society points to an emerging imperative of novelty, creativity and 
innovation within modern societies (Rammert 2010: 47). 
Following the two conceptual parts, the empirical findings in section 6 illuminate how the 
current activities in harnessing social innovations on an international scale are both a solution 
and a problem in modern societies. On the one hand, social innovations promise novel 
solutions to societal problems where traditional state and market instruments have failed. On 
the other hand, social innovations most often occur in bottom-up, grassroots processes in local 
contexts and cannot easily be scaled up to regional or national levels. Innovation societies are 
thus faced with specific difficulties of integrating social innovations in existing governance 
structures, as the case of the EU will show. 
This report on social innovations is intended to provide an overview of the topic and to 
collect central themes which have been addressed so far. By the same token, it cannot 
elaborate on all the issues raised in detail – especially sections 4, 5, and 6 should be read as 
marking relevant conceptual and empirical issues that warrant further discussion. 
 
2. Distinguishing social innovation from technical innovation 
 
Viewing social and technical innovation as distinct entities is a dominant feature in the 
discussion about the specifics of social innovations. Zapf (1989), for instance, separates social 
from material innovations, the former pertaining to changes in organisations, regulations and 
institutions, the latter to novel artefacts and material arrangements. Both types draw on a 
general understanding of innovations as ‘novel material and social technologies which help to 
fulfil our needs and solve social problems in a better way’ (ibid., p. 174, transl. CS). Note that 
Zapf understands both social and material innovations as technologies. This implies that all 
innovations can be broadly understood as technologies, i.e. innovations imply a more or less 
instrumental (as in active and directed) perspective. I will take up this point later on (cf. 
section 5); first, however, I will discuss Zapf’s distinction between social innovation as 
predominantly immaterial and technical innovation as predominantly material. 
Out of the many scholars who have studied the relationship between social and technical 
innovations, Ogburn’s (1922; 1964) seminal work on the relation of material and cultural 
change serves as an important, yet often neglected, reference point (cf. Godin 2010). Zapf 
points out that Ogburn’s theory of ‘cultural lag’, on the one hand emphasises material change 
as the dominant agent of social change in modern societies. On the other hand, Ogburn places 
a high premium on the social innovations which are employed in order to adapt to the rapid 
material changes in modern societies, e.g. social innovations in the areas of law or education. 
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Although Ogburn often is misconceived as a strong proponent of classic technical 
determinism with regard to cultural change, he never in fact succumbed to a reductionist 
model of technological innovation. Ogburn referred not only to material innovations, but to 
changes in material culture, i.e. in those parts of society which are predominantly concerned 
with material reproduction (Ogburn 1922, pp. 268). Even though he emphasised the 
misalignment between material and adaptive cultures and the pressure to change emanating 
from the material cultures and moving towards the adaptive cultures, he neither reduced the 
former to mere technical issues nor the latter to purely social affairs. Both realms of culture 
are always composed of both social and material entities. What stands at the heart of 
Ogburn’s reasoning is not a distinction between technical and social innovation, but a 
perspective of social change that explicitly centres on processes of innovation per se: While 
innovations create pressure to adapt, they also are the very modes of adapting to such novel 
demands. This way, Ogburn can be seen as an early scholar of an emerging innovation 
society, maybe even the first. 
In order to frame the dynamics of innovation as processes of social change, Ogburn 
stresses the interrelatedness of societal subfields in differentiated societies. Under the 
conditions of strong interdependence, novelties in one field are more likely to occasion 
changes in another: ‘To the extent that culture is like a machine with parts that fit, cultural lag 
is widespread.’ (Ogburn 1964, p. 91). As we will see later, social innovations are often framed 
as instruments for reducing cultural lag by serving as an antidote against the adverse effects of 
techno-economic innovations. 
As indicated above, Ogburn did not systematically focus on social innovations and Zapf 
addresses this deficit by pointing out seven different kinds of social innovations identified in 
relevant literature (1989, pp. 175): 
 
1) Organisational change within a company 
2) Novel services as opposed to novel products 
3) Social technologies invented to accompany material innovations 
4) Self-made social inventions by the involved actors 
5) Political innovations triggered by large-scale reforms 
6) Novel patterns of need fulfilment, often sparked by novel technologies 
7) Novel lifestyles, often as adaptations to material and societal changes 
 
From this list we can already see that social innovations are more often than not socio-
technical innovations. Zapf uses this heterogeneous mix of cases not as a clear delineation of 
social innovations from technical innovations, but rather as a collection to counter a 
conceptual and empirical narrowing of the term innovation down to ‘pure’ technical 
innovations. According to Zapf, ‘pure’ social innovations would then be, for instance, leasing 
in the economic realm, summit meetings in the political realm and self-help groups in the 
institutional realm (Zapf based on Brooks 1982). It remains to be seen in how far the latter 
actually qualify as innovations in the sense that they were deliberately pursued. Summit 
meetings, for instance, have a long history and might rather be a case of an emergent 
evolutionary development. Similarly, self-help is hardly new in itself, rather it has taken on 
distinct forms of social organisation. 
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After having separated social from material innovations in this brief and admittedly 
sketchy manner, Zapf elaborates his understanding of social innovations as ‘novel ways to 
reach ends, especially novel forms of organising and regulating, as well as novel lifestyles 
that change the direction of social change, solve problems in a better way than previous 
practices and are therefore worthy of being imitated and institutionalised’ (Zapf 1989, p. 177, 
transl. CS). Zapf’s use of the means/ends motive entails an instrumental notion of social 
innovation which again closely links social innovation to broader concepts of technology. The 
difference between social and technical innovation, then, is not found in a fundamental 
difference, but rather in a gradual difference concerning the realms (social/technical) in which 
innovations predominantly emerge (Howaldt/Schwarz 2010, p. 96). 
The strong similarities between social and technical innovations mentioned thus far, as 
well as the manifold efforts to distinguish between the two, can only be read as a general 
move to reclaim the term ‘innovation’ from a dominant discourse that focuses on technical 
innovation alone (Rammert 2010). This one-sided view of innovation is still an obvious bias 
in academic, economic, political as well as civil debates. Historically, the dominant reference 
to technical innovation is actually somewhat of an oddity. Godin (2008) has traced the use of 
the term ‘innovation’ back to religious and political debates starting in the late fifteenth 
century, when innovation was a derogatory term used to indicate an upset in the natural order 
of things, i.e. the given societal structure. Even without the adjective ‘social’, the term 
‘innovation’ by and large implied social innovation and changes in the societal order. In the 
nineteenth century, the adjective ‘social’ was added to the term innovation in order to denote 
and devalue – mainly communist – ideas and ideals concerning social change. According to 
Godin, it was only in the twentieth century that the term innovation took on a positive (mainly 
through Ogburn) and technical (mainly through Schumpeter) meaning – even though 
Schumpeter himself was more concerned with the economic than the technical aspects of 
innovation, e.g. the creation of new markets or the novel combination of existing elements (cf. 
Rammert 2008). 
The historical shift from negative social connotations of the term innovation up to the late 
19
th
 century to positive technical connotations during the 20
th
 century, and finally positive 
social connotations later in the 20
th
 century, is accompanied by a shift in seeing innovators not 
as subversive heretics, but as creative entrepreneurs, i.e. a shift in the social valuation of 
innovative agency (Godin 2008, p. 23). It also points to a novel and genuinely modern 
understanding of innovation as a corrective agent in industrial societies, where technical and 
social innovations seem to constantly place pressure upon various societal matters, as 
emphasised by Ogburn. Again, this understanding closely links social and technical 
innovation and creates a rather optimistic view of the possibilities of social innovation, similar 
to technical innovations, e.g. in terms such as ‘social engineering’ (Godin 2008, referring to 
Fairweather). Both technical and social innovations are aspects of a modern and rational 
approach to social change. 
The recent emphasis on social innovation should therefore not be misunderstood as a 
conceptual abandonment of materiality or technology, but as an empirical call for the analysis 
of innovation processes which were long neglected due to a dominant focus on technical 
innovations during the last decades. Sometimes, this still leads to juxtapositions of the ‘social’ 
and the ‘technical’ and the proposition of distinct differences (Howaldt/Schwarz 2010, p. 97). 
However, the multitude of socio-technical innovation studies in the field of science and 
technology studies, based, among other approaches, on actor-network theory (ANT) 
(Law/Hassard 1999), have successfully challenged both social and technical reductionisms in 
favour of concepts that allow for the relational and mutual constitution of social and technical 
entities during innovation processes. 
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What is distinctive about social and technical innovations, is not a difference in their inherent 
mechanisms, but rather in their referentiality, a point to which we will turn in section 5. This 
leaves us with a notion of innovation which bears an uncanny resemblance to instrumental 
means-ends relationships found in broad understandings of technology. Yet, scholars in 
science and technology studies (STS) have repeatedly insisted that no instrument or 
technology is ever a mere means to an end (Latour 2002, Rammert 2012). Likewise, social 
innovations are never neutral, but always a transformative force operating according to 
specific logics and rationalities. Last not least, a strict differentiation between social and 
technical innovation becomes dubious when seen from theoretical perspectives in social 
innovation research, mainly practice theory and pragmatism. Howaldt and Schwarz (2010, 
pp.103) argue that both perspectives resonate well with social innovations, because of the 
focus on concrete social practices found in theories of practice and the emphasis on creative 
action found in pragmatism. Both perspectives also highlight the material aspects of social 
practices (cf. Dewey 1929, Reckwitz 2002) and therefore enable a perspective of social and 
technical innovations that is simultaneously material and social. 
So far, it has been argued that a dichotomous distinction between social and technical 
innovations as separate phenomena is of little value. This is because of two main issues: 
- First, most empirical cases are likely to be a mixture of both social and 
technical/material aspects. Reducing empirical innovation dynamics to either social or 
technical determinants would simply miss the point. 
- Second, the history of the term ‘innovation’ shows the different meanings it has 
carried over the centuries. Therefore, there is no ‘inherent’ meaning to the term. What 
unites social and technical innovations in the modern understanding is the shift 
towards a positive connotation. This leads to a more general conceptualisation in 
which innovation is seen as a specific instrument of social change. 
Distinguishing between technical and social innovations then becomes a matter of (1) the 
ways in which both are reflexively brought about on the level of creative social practices, (2) 
the criteria by which their novelty, usefulness and impact are judged (e.g. technical 
effectiveness, economic efficiency, cultural values), and (3) how the changes and adaptations 
they occasion may vary within and across societal fields (concerning their stabilisation and 
transformative potential). Rather than strictly separating social from technical innovations, 
this would highlight first the way that both are socio-technically created and stabilised and 
second how innovations as such have become a central means of change and transformation 
in modern societies. 
 
3. Distinguishing social innovation from social change 
 
Even though social innovations cannot be fundamentally separated from technical 
innovations, we can still maintain that the former are predominantly oriented towards social 
issues, whereas the latter tend to be regarded in techno-economic logics.  Social innovations, 
in essence, are seen to be agents of social change. In contrast to classical understandings of 
evolutionary, undirected and long term social change, social innovations can be outlined by 
six characteristics. 
 
(1) The first important characteristic of innovation concerns the deliberate nature of 
innovative change. Innovation is not an undirected transformation that occurs 
unbeknownst to actors. Rather, it is a purposeful endeavour, undertaken with intent and 
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deliberation. This does, of course, not imply that innovative change can be fully controlled 
by the actors involved. Like all social processes, innovations are subject to unknown 
conditions and unintended consequences of action (Merton 1936). 
(2) This open-endedness of innovations makes them such an intriguing subject matter. 
Innovations can never fully promise to solve a problem at hand; instead, they must be 
monitored, maintained and transformed all throughout the innovative process. When 
innovations become a central means of social change, this in turn is most likely to 
occasion further changes and subsequent innovations. In short, innovation breeds more 
innovation. 
(3) The third characteristic concerns the temporal dimension of innovations. Innovations 
are typically viewed as such within a limited duration, until the next innovation occurs. 
Rammert argues that innovations have a ‘middle range’ temporal extension. They are not 
as short-lived as mere fads or fashions. Nor do they possess the longevity of epochs 
(Rammert 2010, pp. 29). Of course, some social innovations may span centuries, like 
modern social security systems. However, they also undergo significant changes over 
time, and are continuously adapted and re-invented. The temporal extension of innovation 
resides in the fact that, following the arguments of Schumpeter (1939), inventions only 
become actual ‘innovations’ once they diffuse and are stabilised in durable arrangements. 
(4) Of course, innovations need to entail at least some form of novelty. This novelty is 
constitutive of the innovation, but it does not necessarily need to spring from the 
deliberate actions or creative ideas of innovators. Because social innovations do not 
revolve around a material artefact, their novelty and the reasons why they become 
accepted and stabilised may emerge out of the innovation process itself and its unintended 
consequences more so than with technical innovations. Novelty, first of all, is little more 
than a disruption of the old, a discontinuation that may either emerge or be created (in 
Schumpeter’s sense of ‘creative destruction’ 1942, pp. 81)  
(5) The fifth characteristic concerns the scope of innovations. The common distinction 
between incremental and radical or evolutionary and revolutionary innovations points to 
the relation of innovations with other structures. Radical or revolutionary innovations may 
disrupt social order, whereas incremental and evolutionary innovations may preserve the 
status quo, albeit with some slight adjustments. Some social innovations might even be 
conceived to forestall larger impulses towards social change, similar to the 
implementation of social security laws in the late 19th century in terms of curtailing larger 
socialist agendas. 
(6) Last not least, innovations always have a ‘product’ or ‘artefact’1, something that will 
be created and stabilised, something that takes form until it becomes a format. This 
stabilised artefact of innovations stands at the end of the innovation process, but it can 
also be used as the retrospective starting point to trace the innovation back to its 
beginning. 
 
In sum, the deliberate yet open-ended nature, the limited duration with the aspects of novelty 
and the differences in scope and the innovation artefact to be created can be used to 
distinguish social innovations from general processes of social change. Of course, these are 
                                                 
1 Valentin Janda and Jan-Hendrik Passoth have suggested to me the somewhat catchy yet quite untranslatable 
German neologism ‘das Innovat’ for this product of innovation. The term appeals to me, but I will refrain from 
using it – untranslated – in this paper. 
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not exclusive characteristics of social innovations, but when used in a bunch, they help to 
outline the general idea and to narrow down the immense variety of their empirical instances. 
Whereas social change can be used to describe any larger transformation in social and 
cultural patterns, social innovation primarily denotes the mindful and instrumental 
intervention in ongoing social processes (cf. the notion of ‘social engineering’, Popper 1945). 
For instance, changes that are driven by the social tensions of modern capitalism, as Marx 
would have it, are not social innovations as such. Only when specific transformations are 
created as means to an end might they be considered social innovations. This leads to the 
question of how much innovations (social or technical) drive social change and how societies 
adapt to an ongoing stream of innovations (Moore 1960, cf. also a series on social innovation 
in the German economic journal ‘brand eins’). In addition, social innovations are primarily 
considered to be bottom-up, rather than top-down transformations. They are not 
‘interventions’ that go against the public will, but ‘inventions’ that go with it (Whyte 1982). 
Thus, and in contrast to social change per se, social innovations may have limited duration 
and impact, but they are much more deliberate in the terms of the direction of change. 
Even though social change and social innovation should not be equated, they also cannot 
be completely separated, because social change in modern societies most often occurs through 
social innovation (marking them as ‘innovation societies’, Hutter et al. 2011). We are thus 
concerned with social innovation as a mode and means of social change. As a mode of social 
change, social innovations have become the predominant motor of societal transformations. In 
line with Ogburn’s observations on social change, this first of all indicates a quantitative 
increase of innovations. Social innovations can be seen all throughout the history of mankind, 
but modernity is characterised by their dominance in many different societal fields. Also, 
innovations are not rare events, but instead occur in rapid-fire succession. The societal scope 
and temporal density of social innovations marks them as a salient mode of social change. As 
a means of social change, social innovations are used in an increasingly reflexive manner. 
This denotes a qualitative change in the societal understanding of social change itself. Early 
forms of social engineering and technocratic visions of a better society (cf. Veblen 
2006[1921]) mark the beginning of the transition from a mere quantitative increase of 
innovations in society towards a new quality of deliberately seeking social innovations to 
promote social change. This trend continues up until today and, especially in recent years, 
social innovations seem to have become a prime means of encouraging and directing social 
change on many political levels, from local grassroots initiatives to large-scale European 
programmes (see section 6). 
As a means of contemporary social change and in contrast to technocratic understandings 
of social engineering in the first half of the 20th century, social innovations today are – as 
mentioned – predominantly considered to be bottom-up, citizen-driven, local solutions to 
specific problems (cf. MacCallum et al. 2009). This again increases the reflexivity of social 
innovations. Not only are they considered to be an important means of social change, but also 
to be best organised by involving many different actors and perspectives without domination 
through hierarchical planning and control. Thus, social innovations are seen a means for 
organising change that cannot be fully planned or controlled. In addition, their limitations as 
temporal and local solutions are acknowledged by increasing the societal scope and overall 
tempo of social innovations. This way, no single social innovation needs to promise a positive 
outcome; instead, an unending stream of innovations must safeguard against the fallacies of 
hierarchical planning and facilitate a stronger involvement of the public in matters of social 
change. 
The idea of innovation as a means of social change therefore must be seen as a question of 
the reflexive dynamic between social innovations and society. This question will be addressed 
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in the next section by sketching out a theoretical framework which allows us to conceptualise 
the interdependencies of social innovations situated in emerging innovation societies. 
 
4. Reflexivities of social innovations 
 
When social innovations are reflexively used to stimulate and govern social change, they do 
not remain simple modes of transformation. As indicated above, social innovations as means 
of change today may have become ends in themselves. The positive normative expectations 
imbued in the term mark it as a general solution to many divergent problems (cf. Mulgan 
2006). The gradual change of social innovations from a more or less unreflected mode to a 
deliberate means and finally to an end in themselves delineates an increase in the reflexive use 
of social innovations. This essentially leads to the question of how novelty and social change 
are actively created in modern societies (Hutter et al. 2011). If novelty and innovation become 
ends in themselves, this may on the one hand lead to greater social creativity, but on the other 
hand it may also abstract from the actual substance of novelty and innovation and lead to a 
successive staccato of irrelevant inventions, which do not ultimately evolve into more durable 
innovations. 
So far, the reflexive use of social innovations has been primarily addressed as a shifting 
orientation towards social change in society itself. Social innovations can thus be seen as an 
aspect of reflexive modernisation (Beck et al. 1994). Whereas classical modernity paved the 
way by imposing permanent technical innovation upon society – very much like Ogburn 
observed – social innovation and innovation per se have now become a reflexively wielded 
instrument to initiate and govern societal change. If it is true that a societal awareness of 
continuous directed change is an – if not the – essential feature of modern society and if it is 
true that specific understandings and promises of innovation are increasingly employed to 
tackle the problems associated with this type of change, this would indicate two related 
dynamics of transforming society through reflexive innovation. The first dynamic concerns 
the changes brought about by reflexive innovations themselves. When social innovations are 
reflexively used to control and guide social change, they at the same time become distinct 
means of governance. This, in turn, relates to a second, less obvious but perhaps even more 
powerful dynamic of an innovation perspective on social change. When innovations become a 
dominant means of social change, they deeply influence the epistemology of social change, 
i.e. the ways in which societal needs and aims are observed, evaluated, and implemented. 
 
Three meanings of reflexivity 
 
Before each dynamic is discussed in greater detail, we need to clarify how these dynamics 
relate to general discussions about reflexivity and social innovations. ‘Reflexivity’ as a 
sociological term is both widely used and diversely defined (cf. Beck et al. 1994). For the 
purpose of this paper, I will distinguish between three meanings of reflexivity which I call 
fundamental reflexivity, reflexivity of social order and reflexivity of consequences. In short, 
the discussion of reflexive social innovations will concern the latter two meanings, and the 
two dynamics mentioned above will be related to them accordingly. 
Let us first consider fundamental reflexivity and its significance for social innovation. As 
a sociological term, fundamental reflexivity has become well accepted. All social theories 
account for some basic reflexivity of human action in order to distinguish it from mere 
behaviour or instinct. This not only includes consciousness and self-consciousness, but also 
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an active engagement with the environment and interaction with others (Lynch 2000). In this 
fundamental sense, reflexivity can be reformulated as a problem of contingency or the human 
capacity for choice. It can also be traced back to anthropological considerations about the 
open-endedness of human conduct under conditions of uncertainty. Without going into any 
details of these discussions, fundamental reflexivity addresses some form of awareness of 
oneself and the environment (including others). In this basic capacity – as a part of any human 
action –, reflexivity also figures as a constitutive element of the social. However, it does not 
allow for any distinctions between more or less reflexive forms of social innovation. 
The second meaning of reflexivity, the reflexivity of social order, is related to the first 
meaning, but specifically reformulated as a question of social order. Such an understanding is 
also common in sociological thought, for instance in the writings of Giddens (1984). In this 
sense, reflexivity denotes the recursive and continuous monitoring and ordering of social 
practices: ‘‘Reflexivity’ hence should be understood not merely as ‘self-consciousness’ but as 
the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life’ (ibid., p. 3). In that way, it is not 
only a matter of doing things differently, but also of reproducing social order: ‘strategically 
placed actors seek reflexively to regulate the overall conditions of system reproduction either 
to keep things as they are or to change them’ (ibid., pp. 27). This meaning of reflexivity is 
situated at the level of basic sociological theory about the constitution of the social 
(‘Sozialtheorie’ in German). Translated to the study of social innovations, this would mean 
that in contrast to non-reflexive forms of social innovation, reflexive innovators are, first, 
more ‘self-aware’ of the fact that they are engaged in social innovations and, second, that this 
knowledge is used to engage with the innovation process itself. The recent increase in the use 
of the term would support such a reflexive use of social innovations, as a quick Google 
Ngram search suggests (figure 1). Books published during the peak between the early 1960s 
and the late 1980s include such diverse topics such as urban change (Rosenbloom 1969), 
community psychology and experimental social innovation (ESI, cf. Fairweather 1972), or the 
division of labour in the household (Gershuny 1983). 
 
 
Figure 1: Ngram search of the term ‘social innovation’ in the English corpus of Google Books, 2 July 2013 
 
Last not least, the third meaning of reflexivity, the reflexivity of consequences focuses on the 
societal consequences of increasingly employing social innovation as a distinct form of social 
change. This meaning of reflexivity is situated at the conceptual level of diagnostic social 
theory or critical social theory, seeking to analyse characteristics of modern society 
(‘Gesellschaftstheorie’ in German). This is the meaning, for instance, of ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ (Beck et al. 1994) which deals especially with the (problematic) 
‘consequences of modernity’ (Giddens 1990). In contrast to the reflexivity of social order, the 
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reflexivity of consequences does not focus on monitoring and control, but rather unforeseen 
consequences, unintended effects, ambiguities and things getting out-of-control: ‘‘Reflexive’ 
does not mean that people today lead a more conscious life. On the contrary. ‘Reflexive’ 
signifies not an ‘increase of mastery and consciousness, but a heightened awareness that 
mastery is impossible’ (Latour 2003)’ (Beck et al. 2003, p. 3). From this perspective, social 
innovations can be both a problem and a solution. On the one hand, they can be seen as a 
solution to the failing hierarchical modes of planning and governing of classical modernity 
and thus become a central mode of change under conditions of reflexive modernisation. On 
the other hand, they may also pose new problems by producing unintended consequences, for 
instance a preoccupation with the promises of novelty and a neglect of modes of stabilisation 
– thus adding to the ambiguities of reflexive modernisation. Either way, social innovations in 
reflexive modernity cannot be seen as purely social, but must be seen as socio-material 
processes, since ‘reflexivity in the second modernity is profoundly socio-technical.’ (Lash 
2003, p. 55). 
The above discussion of different meanings of the term reflexivity sketched out three 
different perspectives: the first is fundamental or anthropological, the second concerns social 
order per se, and the third regards societal consequences of modernity. Each perspective 
addresses different aspects of sociological inquiry and I will now go into more detail as to 
how the latter two perspectives relate to two concrete dynamics associated with social 
innovations. 
 
Reflexivity of social order 
 
The first dynamic primarily addresses the issues of change and stability in processes of social 
change, which has always been a central topic of sociological inquiry. Mead, for instance, put 
this binary in the focus of his discussion of the evolution of human societies: 
‘That is the problem of society, is it not? How can you present order and structure in society and yet bring 
about the changes that need to take place, are taking place? How can you bring those changes about in 
orderly fashion and yet preserve order? To bring about change is seemingly to destroy the given order, and 
yet society does and must change. That is the problem, to incorporate the methods of change into the order 
of society itself.’ (Mead 1936, pp. 361). 
Mead saw the scientific method as central means of change in modern societies, a means 
which allowed for a controlled and reflexive engagement with societal problems. For Mead, 
the scientific method first of all is a method for becoming aware of problems, for imagining 
possible alternatives and finding an adequate solution by testing it. The evolution of society 
and the emergence of novelty therefore do not happen ‘behind the backs’ of actors, but are 
due to their conscious involvement, which on the one hand creates durable institutions and on 
the other hand questions their existence. The relation of change and stability thus becomes the 
prime question for the constitution of social order. For modern societies, this relation is 
increasingly a matter of awareness or reflexive management.
2
 Though we might not share 
Mead’s confidence in the scientific method as the prime model for the advancement of 
modern societies, his general insights into the evolution of methods for controlling societal 
change do point us in the right direction. 
Similar to Mead’s understanding of scientific inquiry, social innovations link stability and 
change through the creation of novelty. In this sense, there can be no radical novelty, but only 
                                                 
2 Of course, the increased reflexive use of social innovations can be seen in itself as an innovation which was recently 
promoted by interested actors, including social scientist. And as we have seen in section 2, the term innovation itself 
has taken on quite different meanings in the past two centuries. 
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novelty that is created by variations of past habits and in expectation of the future. Mead calls 
this the process of ‘emergence’, which he sees as a fundamental feature of human action 
(Mead 1932). For social innovations, we might lower the criterion for novelty even further. 
Social innovations might not be novel in the sense that they entail a distinct form of newness, 
but in that existing social practices are transferred to other societal realms. Or, something 
might be neither distinctly nor relatively new, but only perceived or labelled as novel. This 
way, reflexive social innovation would not have to be concerned with creating novelty in 
itself, but with monitoring the diversity of social life and looking for already developed yet 
locally confined solutions. This would amount to a more or less evolutionary or ecological 
approach of ‘niche management’ (Kemp et al. 2001), in which the dynamics of social life are 
seen as a motor for producing manifold variations – or inventions – which might be taken up 
and extended across time and space in order to become innovations. In contrast to 
hierarchically and planned modes of change, the evolutionary model entails a more open wait-
and-see attitude which dispenses with ideas of deterministic control. 
When social innovations become reflexive means of social change, questions of where to 
locate emergence, as well as the source of novelty and creativity, come into focus. Depending 
on where that prized yet unpredictable locus is situated, using social innovations reflexively 
also means to realise them differently. In contrast to biological evolution, social innovation is 
rarely ‘blind’. Therefore, novelty is no simple variation or mutation, but it is always oriented 
toward solving something which is perceived as a societal problem. A broad societal and 
reflexive use of social innovations as means of social change consequently points to a 
plurality of modes of social innovation. And in addition to diverse understandings concerning 
the emergence of novelty, we would expect to find assumptions of how creative inventions 
become stabilised in durable innovations. For instance, if reductionist ideas of technical 
innovation are taken as blueprints for social innovation, they would include the creative 
power of entrepreneurial actors, but they would also imply mechanistic assumptions about the 
diffusion of innovations based on the logic of efficiency. On the other hand, ideas that stress 
the mutual constitution of technological and social change would argue for creative solutions 
emerging out of an interactive trial-and-error process, which do not simply diffuse, but are 
actively produced and transformed through multiple translations as they progress through 
society (Latour 1986). Thus, when social innovations become reflexive means of social 
change, they must not only account for their capacity to produce creative variations, but also 
whether they are able to be transformed into and implemented in durable socio-material 
patterns (cf. Gillwald 2000 and section 6 on the EU initiatives). 
Looking at the reflexivity of social innovations from the perspective of social order, we 
can observe that the promises of innovation per se have captured the imagination of many 
societal fields, even to the point of becoming a powerful imperative for innovative action 
(Hutter et al. 2011). When social innovations become reflexively integrated in the production 
of social order, i.e. in the ‘monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life’ (Giddens 
1984, p. 3), this may initiate an increasing pressure to focus on novelty as a dominant and 
legitimate feature of its re-organisation. If such a major transformation is still currently in 
progress is an open empirical question. A mere increase in the rhetoric and discourse about 
social innovation must not directly relate to an increase in the organising of social change or 
its practical accomplishment. Various modes of ‘decoupling’ (Meyer/Rowan 1977), e.g. 
between talking about and doing social innovation, are likely to mediate between the 
fashionable term ‘social innovation’ and the many practical instances of change which might 
not make use of the term at all. 
In addition, if social innovation becomes a pervasive form of social change, this would 
most likely lead to more or less routinised social innovations, which in the end may severely 
restrict their degree of novelty. Here we encounter a distinct problem of social innovation, 
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which will be addressed in more detail in section five. That is, with classical technical 
innovation, novelty can be easily framed as an increase in technical or economic efficiency. 
Such a simple criterion of evaluating progress does not hold for social innovations – rather, 
social innovations are embedded in multiple frames of reference and evaluation. Routine 
social innovation implies some form of logic that guides activity, otherwise its novelty will 
imply only a difference to what previously existed, but there will be no criterion to measure 
an actual ‘improvement’. In the end, reflexive social innovation would require greater 
knowledge of how social innovations actually function and would have to apply this 
knowledge to manage reflexive social innovations. 
 Giddens (1990, pp. 36) uses reflexivity in this sense to distinguish between traditional 
and modern societies. Modern societies, he argues, become increasingly reflexive. The social 
innovations in the 19th century can already be seen as an indicator for this process, since ‘the 
reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly 
examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus 
constitutively altering their character’ (ibid., p. 38). Even more so, innovations themselves 
become modern instruments for continually revising conventions which pervade ‘all aspects 
of human life, including technological intervention into the material world’ (ibid., p. 39). 
Social and technical innovations thus originate from the same source of modernity, both being 
reflexive modes of creating change. But this form of increased reflexivity as ‘the continual 
generating of systematic self-knowledge’ (ibid., p. 45) does not denote a greater degree of 
control through increased knowledge of the underlying social mechanisms; rather, it creates 
unintended consequences which need be subsequently addressed. 
Summing up, the reflexivity of social innovations on the level of social order can be 
analysed in a twofold dynamic. First, by examining the integration of an innovation model of 
social change into the governance of social order. Innovativeness (both in terms of novelty 
and durability) would thus be conceptualised as a central criterion along which diverse sets of 
actors monitor the flow of social life around them and organise their actions. In this view, 
social coordination would be based on a shared orientation towards social innovation and the 
relation of stability and change which underlies it. Second, under the conditions of a 
knowledge society, this integration would be accompanied by an increase in conceptual 
knowledge about social innovations, and perhaps even specific theories of social innovation. 
Increased reflexivity would then lead to studying how the concept social innovation is itself a 
social innovation, both for better understanding its internal dynamics, as well as those of 
actual innovation processes. This sounds more cumbersome than it actually is. Empirically, 
we would simply assume that the societal discussion of social change references social 
innovation on many different levels and also distinguishes among what it comes to regard as 
‘real’, ‘fake’ and ‘routine’ social innovations. 
 
Reflexivity of consequences 
 
Now let us consider the second dynamic, the reflexivity of consequences. This perspective 
allows us to analyse the unintended side effects and ambiguities of ‘runaway’ social 
innovation.
3
 Again, this can be simpler than it sounds. For the purpose of this paper, I will 
distinguish between two modes of rampant innovation. The first is the closest to a common 
                                                 
3 The reflexivity of consequences used in the sense of reflexive modernisation (Beck et al. 1994) emphasises the 
problems and tensions emerging from unanticipated consequences (Merton 1936). This negative bias is a salient 
feature in this discussion, however, we can equally assume that the reflexivity of consequences produces positive 
effects. For the purpose of the paper I will nevertheless concentrate on possible negative consequences. 
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understanding of the term, i.e. describing the condition that social innovations have become 
an end in themselves, universally applied with little thought as to their efficacy. In this sense, 
social innovations have become the rampaging ‘golems’ of modern societies, indiscriminately 
casting all social problems as dire candidates to be solved by social innovation. I deliberately 
exaggerate this dynamic to the point of caricature in order to break with the dominant positive 
connotations currently attached to the terms ‘innovation’ and especially ‘social innovation’. In 
one scenario, an overly positive idea of social innovation could result in an increasing 
association of innovation primarily with change while neglecting the critical aspect of 
stability, which in turn might produce a rapid succession of novelties without any ties to the 
fabric of social order. A second aspect of novelty gone astray is more subtle. Ideas about 
social innovation become so deeply embedded in the governance of social order that they 
grow to be largely taken-for-granted, invisible and, hence, out-of-control. This argument can 
be made along the same lines as Winner’s (1977) depiction of ‘technics-out-of-control’. 
Winner argues that some technologies have such deeply embedded political characteristics 
that they can be regarded as inherently political technologies (Winner 1980). This is not to say 
that technologies determine politics, but that some technical and political orders are very 
much compatible: ‘The available evidence tends to show that many large, sophisticated 
technological systems are in fact highly compatible with centralized, hierarchical managerial 
control.’ (ibid., p. 132). Winner uses the example of nuclear power to highlight the mutual 
stabilisation of centrally organised technology and centrally organised control, i.e. of nuclear 
power and the nation state. Thus, once the decision for a specific technology and its inherent 
order are made, it is hardly reversible and increasing beyond the grasp of deliberate choice; it 
is, in other words, out-of-control. In the following paragraphs, I will follow the latter 
understanding of out-of-control and relate it to the question of social innovations as well as 
recent discussions of performativity (MacKenzie 2006). 
Let us first consider how we can translate Winner’s ideas concerning concrete and 
material technologies such as nuclear power to the study of intangible social innovations. One 
line of thought has been pointed out already, namely that social innovations more often than 
not are socio-technical endeavours. We would then have to look at the material or technical 
aspects of social innovations in order to find their hidden political nature and then determine 
how compatible this is with a specific political order of social innovations. When studying the 
material side of social innovations and how they might go awry, this is in fact a promising 
perspective on the mutual constitution of the technical and the social. Another line of thought 
was mentioned only briefly: thinking of social innovations as forms of ‘social engineering’ 
(Popper 1945) allows us to conceive of them as social technologies. The inherent political 
nature of social innovations as social technologies then lies in their instrumental perspective 
on the social. Social innovations carry with them, in a way, specific ideas how social change 
can be ‘engineered’, i.e. some kind of knowledge about specific locales and methods for 
initiating social change: rather bottom-up than top-down and rather participatory than 
hierarchical. Such a ‘grassroots’ idea of engineering obviously differs from a classical 
understanding, yet without similar promises of effectiveness and efficiency, social 
innovations would hardly be undertaken. By being ubiquitously employed, concepts of social 
innovation subsequently become deeply ingrained in the management of social change, co-
formatting the way social change is perceived and organised. This argument would be 
stretched too far if it began to portrait social innovation as a colonising, deterministic force. 
Rather, this discussion makes us sensitive to certain aspects of social innovations under the 
conditions of reflexive modernity, highlighting the possible adverse effects if they are 
pervasively employed as political instruments. To name just two examples: first, concepts of 
social innovations often draw upon an underlying entrepreneurial ideology (Mulgan et al. 
2007, Phills Jr. et al. 2008), especially when formulated from an economic perspective. 
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Second, they may force objective criteria for evaluating the actual ‘innovativeness’ of an 
alleged social innovation, especially under the conditions of scarce resources and an increased 
legitimacy of innovation (Preskill/Beer 2012). In this way, the reflexive consequences of 
social innovations would occasion a more or less uncontrolled shift in the epistemology and 
evaluation of social change. 
We can extend this argument in a second step by further analysing how reflexive social 
innovations may become means to both perceive and manipulate social change. For instance, 
arguments about the performativity of economics (Callon 1998, MacKenzie 2006) discuss 
how economic theories shape economic realities. As dominant paradigms, economic theories 
guide the actions of market actors and, by shaping economic actions, the market models 
slowly become market realities. Similarly, concepts of social innovation entail specific 
knowledge about the social world and its functioning, i.e. about the relation of novelty, 
change and stability. Following Giddens argument, social innovations have become part of 
the reflexively applied knowledge through which modernity is constituted and they thereby 
shape or guide the actions taken towards managing social change. Seen from the reflexivity of 
consequences, knowledge about social innovations will not necessary result in the 
increasingly skilful management of social change, but may entail new uncertainties and 
ambiguities, since this reflexive knowledge about the social world ‘contributes to its unstable 
or mutable character’ (Giddens 1990, p. 45). 
In order to analyse the reflexivity of consequences for social innovations, it is helpful to 
consider their performative effects on three levels, which can only be hinted at here (see 
Hutter et al. 2011 for a more detailed discussion). The first is the semantic level of societal 
discourse. Undoubtedly, the use of the term ‘social innovation’ has increased in the social 
sciences, politics and the public sphere. However, different concepts of social innovation are 
likely to highlight different aspects or promises (‘bottom-up’, ‘entrepreneurial’), perhaps to 
the point of presenting incommensurable claims. Second, changes on the semantic level 
would have to relate to changes on the grammatical level, i.e. the extent to which social 
innovations transform the actual organisation of change. For instance, evolving practices of 
monitoring and evaluating social innovations would indicate an increasing performativity of 
social innovations. Last not least, we would assume to find changes on the pragmatic level of 
concrete actions. Concepts of social innovations would then guide numerous social practices 
concerned with social change. Of course, all three levels are interlinked and in order to 
analyse the reflexivity of consequences of social innovations, we would have to come up with 
a portrait of their interrelated dynamics, i.e. in how far they mutually enable and constrain 
each other. Especially under the conditions of reflexive modernity, we are not likely to find a 
clear-cut concept of social innovation becoming a dominant paradigm, but rather a multitude 
of heterogeneous and inconsistent ideas, which are generally subsumed under the label of 
social innovation. And as Giddens pointed out, an increased knowledge about the social world 
is likely to increase ambiguities and uncertainties instead of reducing them. In the following 
section, such increasing difficulties of defining social innovations will be discussed. 
 
5. Multiple references of social innovations 
 
Without doubt, technical innovation remains the main reference for social innovations. It 
provides the general positive association of innovation with novelty and progress. Technical 
innovation also provides two clear dimensions along which innovativeness can be measured: 
technical effectiveness and economic efficiency. This close and dominant interrelation of 
technical and economic features in technical innovations serves as the first distinction 
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between technical and social innovations. Of course, reducing technical innovations to mere 
technical and economic features is far too restrictive, but for the sake of the argument, we will 
retain this distinction as a heuristic that provides an effective contrast to social innovations. 
From the outside, technical innovation seems to be a straight-forward matter of efficiency and 
effectiveness, whereas social innovations are less easily defined. In the following paragraphs, 
I will outline the multiple references of social innovations in order to sketch out a general 
picture in which the discussion of social innovations can be situated (cf. Rammert 2010). 
The characteristics of techno-economic innovations have been seminally defined in the 
works of Schumpeter (here especially Schumpeter 1939, pp. 72), where innovation is seen as 
the internal motor driving economic evolution. Techno-economic innovations themselves are 
mainly driven by entrepreneurial ‘technology push’ action and not by consumers ‘demand 
pull’. Using the case of railways, Schumpeter argues that consumers cannot formulate a novel 
demand until a novel product actually creates that demand. 
(1) The first characteristic of innovations would thus be entrepreneurial action and this is 
also a main reference of social innovations (Phills Jr. et al. 2008). ‘Entrepreneurial’, however, 
must not necessarily be equated with ‘economic’. Interestingly, Schumpeter himself does not 
restrict the term ‘innovation’ to mere technical innovation, but also includes the creation of 
new markets and organisational forms – his main reference for innovation being the economy. 
In his own words, innovations are ‘any “doing things differently” in the realm of economic 
life’ (Schumpeter 1939, p. 84). Some social innovations can thus be framed in economic 
terms, like Tayloristic approaches to reorganising work, but other social innovations, just like 
Tayloristic production itself, may also extend into other frames of reference, like political and 
civil realms. Relating social innovation to entrepreneurial actions while extending both 
concepts beyond strictly economic rationales resonates well with the sociological insight that 
change and stability in modern societies are increasingly created and sustained by interested 
parties. For instance, Hughes (1936) argues that institutions in modern societies have become 
more flexible and dynamic, and it is the ‘consequent precariousness of their existence that 
makes institutions, perforce, enterprises’ (ibid., p. 138), which require active reproduction. 
Hughes views the entrepreneur as a person ‘who undertakes to coordinate the activities of 
others’ while he also ‘makes decisions and meets contingencies’, both of which in the end 
‘become[s] a crucial feature in a society where the mores, whatever else they may do, do not 
foreordain that the individual shall stay put and remain within’ (ibid.). 
(2) The second characteristic of innovations in a society where individuals ‘do not stay 
put’ and constantly ‘do things differently’ is of course novelty itself. Here, Schumpeter 
emphasises the difference between invention and innovation. Invention, according to 
Schumpeter, suggests some sort of scientific novelty, which is not at all at the core of his 
understanding of innovation: ‘Innovation is possible without anything we should identify as 
invention and invention does not necessarily induce innovation, but produces of itself no 
economically relevant effect at all.’ (Schumpeter 1939, p. 84). Doing things differently 
therefore does not presuppose novelty in the sense of invention, but extends it to new uses of 
existing means or resources. Innovation, in Schumpeter’s sense, concerns the economic 
exploitation of novelty, irrespective of how it is brought about and where it occurs. In other 
words, innovation does not presuppose genuine novelty, but may combine existing elements 
in a new way. For Schumpeter, the novelty of innovations is not interesting in terms of 
novelty as such, but in the way the new replaces the old. His now famous formulation of 
‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 1942, pp. 81) underscores this point neatly. Schumpeter 
based this idea on the writings of Marx and Engels, who defined it as a main characteristic of 
capitalist economies, but for him it captured the essence of innovations as factors in economic 
growth: Innovations in a capitalist economy spur the never-ending cyclical development in 
which the new replaces the old by increasing chances for profit. And innovations themselves 
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are driven by entrepreneurs, who creatively seek to exploit such opportunities. The emphasis 
on creative destruction occurring through entrepreneurial actions nevertheless tends to 
highlight processes of change over stability. 
(3) As a third characteristic of innovations, their stability is equally important for 
Schumpeter. Only after they have become widely accepted can the entrepreneur reap the 
profits and make up for previous investments. In economic terms, the entrepreneur is 
interested in keeping innovations in place until their returns diminish and it is time for a novel 
innovation. Exploiting innovations along an s-curve of increasing and diminishing returns is, 
of course, a distinctly economic logic and it would be quite difficult to apply such measures in 
different realms. But it does point to the interesting question of whether innovations (based 
upon a cyclical logic) have an internal ‘sell-by-date’ which depends on the societal field in 
which they are employed and on the scope they acquire. Schumpeter’s innovation cycles, e.g. 
in the case of railways, typically last for some decades. The plurality of social innovations 
would suggest that we find time spans which significantly vary from those of a typical 
business cycle. It is also uncertain whether social innovations, like economic innovations, 
suffer from diminishing returns. In addition to profit development, the question of stability 
also points in another direction, namely that of resistance to change. Schumpeter is quite 
aware that innovations have to overcome substantial hurdles in the form of basic resistance to 
novelty, habits and the uncertainty associated with innovation. Innovations are therefore less 
likely to be radically new than partial readjustments of existing practices. 
 
Single- and multi-referencing innovations 
 
Schumpeter’s insistence on the dominant economic reference of innovations on the one hand 
limits the scope of his arguments. On the other hand it helps us to identify a very basic 
distinction in the references of social innovations. (Social) innovations in the economy can be 
defined as single-referencing innovations, i.e. innovations valued in their own right in the 
sense that they are inherent to the economic system, driven by internal forces and evaluated in 
economic terms. This Schumpeter-type innovation emphasises the creative/innovative 
processes which fundamentally govern a specific societal field. For instance, innovativeness 
in modern sciences and the arts also follows an internal logic of novelty and ‘out with the old, 
in with the new’. In science, new theories, methods and instruments constantly challenge 
established arrangements. In the arts, new ways of painting, sculpting or performing compete 
for acceptance and funding both among themselves and with established forms. Single-
referencing is thus not aimed at the level of the innovation itself, but must be understood in an 
evolutionary and ecological manner, which relates innovations primarily to the dominant 
logics of creating and evaluating change applied within the societal field in which they occur. 
Multi-referencing innovations present a different case. These types of innovations would not 
be driven by some internal logic of a given field, but instead be better understood as 
adaptations to changes in the environment. I will refer to this category as Ogburn-type 
innovations, provided that they are primarily oriented towards decreasing the lag or tension 
created by any maladjustment between different societal spheres. This describes many social 
innovations in the political realm, reacting for instance to innovations in the economic or 
technical realm. Multi-referencing social innovations then refer not to an internal logic of 
change, but are seen as solutions to specific social needs (Mulgan 2006). Whereas single-
referencing innovations are mainly targeted at growth, multi-referencing innovations in this 
sense are aimed at reducing deficits: they are not a means of staying ahead, but of catching up. 
Despite their differences, both types of social innovations are inextricably linked with the 
dynamics of modernity and, as Ogburn would argue, the fast-paced speed of single-
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referencing innovations in one area (e.g. the economy) creates a need for multi-referencing 
innovations in others. 
Both social and technical innovations can either be single-referencing or multi-
referencing. And a close scrutiny of single-referencing innovations would most likely reveal 
that there will be no pure single reference, but rather one dominant reference among others. 
Finally, because of the progressing reflexivity of innovations, single-referencing innovations 
might actually be increasingly replaced by multi-referencing innovations in an innovation 
society. However, this complex and probably seamless web (Hughes 1986) of innovations 
will prove difficult to trace. 
From this perspective, the distinction between single and multi-referencing social 
innovations does not entail an essential difference between the two, but highlights the key 
issue of how they are evaluated. Since innovation is primarily a means of initiating and 
implementing change, it is not evaluated by itself, but in terms of what it enables. A good 
innovation is not characterised by the adherence to an abstract scheme of ‘best-practice 
innovating’, but instead by its result. Of course, when innovation becomes a reflexive means 
of social change, it is believed to have an inherent quality which distinguishes it from other 
means of change. Yet this quality is not regarded in its own right, but as a vehicle for 
something else. However, innovations and the outcomes they enable should not be thought of 
as completely separate. Rather, innovations, their outcomes and the evaluations of both are 
essentially interlinked, that is, they are mutually performative. In order to disentangle this 
relation, I will draw on Dewey’s (1939) theory of valuation which criticises a dichotomous 
distinction between means and ends and which as inspired the recent interest in valuations (cf. 
Kjellberg/Mallard 2013), especially a sociological reconsideration of economic actions 
(Boltanski/Thévenot 2006[1991], Stark 2009, Beckert/Aspers 2011).
4
 
 
References and valuations 
 
Dewey argues that the common distinction between relationally valuable means and 
inherently valuable ends builds upon a simplistic dichotomy between the two concepts. This 
difference is also prevalent in different uses of the term ‘valuing’. On the one hand, it 
connotes what Dewey refers to as ‘prizing’, i.e. as holding something precious in itself. On 
the other hand, it refers to ‘appraising’, i.e. the process of putting a price or value on 
something (ibid., p. 5). Dewey sees prizing as a more personal and emotional affair (a matter 
of desire), whereas appraising is a matter of intellectual calculation (a matter of interest). 
However, both are aspects of larger issues of valuation as he conceives valuation to be a basic 
process in all human affairs (ibid., p. 57). His main argument is that neither desires nor 
interests exist in isolation from the actions or means which are employed to satisfy a certain 
need. As Dewey puts it, desires and interests are not ends-in-themselves, but rather ends-in-
view. The basic conception of ends-in-view is that there is, first, no dichotomy, but a 
continuum between means and ends and that, second, ends and values are created in processes 
of change and contestation. Both aspects of ends-in-view provide fruitful engagements with 
the questions of the multiple references and valuations of social innovations. 
Let us first consider the notion of ends and valuations being formed in processes of 
change and contestation (ibid., pp. 33). Dewey proposes that ends and values only come to 
matter if the taken-for-grantedness of routine conduct is disturbed: ‘When things are going 
                                                 
4 As far as I can see, the promising links between studies of social innovations and studies of valuation processes 
have not yet been exploited and at the current stage this paper can only hint at some of these intersections. 
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completely smoothly, desires do not arise, and there is no occasion to project ends-in-view, 
for “going smoothly” signifies that there is no need for effort and struggle.’ (ibid., p. 33). The 
disruption of a routine denotes at the same time an intervention inserted in otherwise habitual 
processes of impulse and execution. Only in this disruption may ends-in-view emerge and 
intervene in the previous order of affairs and ‘it is only in such cases that valuation occurs’ 
(ibid., p. 34). Valuation is thus a fundamental social process which pertains to all human 
actions concerned with change or novelty. And this fundamental link between valuation and 
situations of contestation or trouble provides a good starting point for discussing the relation 
of valuation and innovation. Evidently, all innovative activity deals with some kind of 
problematic situation in the sense that the previous order of things is perceived to be 
undesirable and actions are undertaken so as to bring about a more favourable situation. 
The resolution of the problematic situation then rests, according to Dewey, on two 
assumptions. First, the identification of the problem to date has been inadequate and, second, 
the measures to be taken will prove appropriate for resolving the issue. Both assumptions 
entail valuations of the situation at hand, of the means employed and of the ends to be 
achieved. Differences in evaluating innovations thus reside in different evaluations of the 
adequacy of the definition of the problematic situation and the appropriateness of the means 
to resolve it. It follows that multi-referencing social innovations in particular may not always 
be seen as adequate solutions for a designated problem. Rather, the way in which a social 
innovation frames a specific problem and the means to solve it, can become an issue of 
contestation. Thus, we can extend the issue of valuation raised above: it is not only the 
outcomes that are evaluated, but also the means with which they are brought about. As Dewey 
himself emphasises: ‘Propositions in which things (acts and materials) are appraised as 
means enter necessarily into desires and interests that determine end-values.’ (ibid., p. 35.). 
Valuations of outcomes then depend on the valuations of the means to the extent that these 
outcomes depend on the means intended to achieve them. The distinction between technical 
or economic innovations and social innovation thus cannot be fully explained by referring to 
different values in different fields. Based on Dewey’s theory of valuation, functional technical 
effectiveness and profitable economic efficiency cannot be conceptualised as ‘final’ values 
within the fields of engineering or economics, but must be understood as being inextricably 
linked to the means employed to reach these ends. When transposing the concept of 
innovation from the technical and economic realm to broader societal fields, it does not 
suffice to point to a change in reference structures for valuating (the outcome of) innovations, 
e.g. aesthetics in the arts or participation in politics. Rather, the focus shifts towards the way 
these values are being achieved and transformed by turning to social innovation as a central 
means of initiating and conducting processes of change. In addition, valuations arise out of 
problematic situations, e.g. situations in which established ways of ‘going on’ are questioned 
and means and ends are mutually reconfigured. 
This leads us to the second idea of a continuum of means and ends. Since Dewey so 
emphatically argues against the classical dichotomy of means as subservient to final ends (cf. 
also Dewey 1929[1925], pp. 121), the question of valuation cannot be answered fully without 
examining the relationship of ends and means in somewhat greater detail (Dewey 1939, pp. 
40). The classical assumption about the separation of ends and means can be stretched to the 
point that the ‘end justifies the means’, which marks the strongest notion of an end 
independent of means. Such a statement, for Dewey, is quite absurd. Not only because it 
severs the inherent relations of valuation between ends and means, but also because it 
forecloses the possibility that the ends themselves can become means to further ends. For him, 
an end is only an intermediate stage in an ongoing process in which ends become means to 
further ends etc. This way, there is nothing final, i.e. independent, about an end; instead, it 
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unfolds in a network of references between ends and means, or, as Dewey puts it: ‘the 
distinction between ends and means is temporal and relational’ (ibid., p. 43). 
Some ends however, may acquire the status of a custom within a social group. Such ends 
typically remain unquestioned and therefore seem to be relatively independent to the point of 
becoming seemingly ‘final’. Still, such ends refer ‘to a specifiable temporal means-end 
relation and not to something which is an end per se’ (ibid., p. 45). Seemingly final ends 
emerge in specific social groups. Dewey cites examples such as money making, political 
power, advancement of scientific knowledge and military prowess (ibid., p. 43). Obviously, 
the social groups and ends correspond to specific societal spheres: the economy, politics, 
science and military. We can easily add further spheres: the arts, religion, education, each 
containing specifiable means-ends relationships in the form of an institutionalised and 
seemingly final end. It must be noted that the unfolding of such means-ends configurations is 
a natural social process of slowly abstracting concrete ends into more abstract and general 
ends through repetition, routinisation and habitualisation. The existence of seemingly final 
ends must, however, not be confused with their development and analysis. Even though they 
transcend individual cases, they are inherently tied into the specific means-ends relationship 
of their respective social sphere. Or, as Dewey (ibid., p. 44) points out, abstract ends become 
means of regulating conduct, i.e. they become instruments of judgement and examination. To 
use more recent terminology, the abstracts ends are the medium and result of social practices 
(Giddens 1984). Over time, a social field ‘develops a sort of framework of conditions to be 
satisfied  –  a framework of reference which operates in an empirically regulative way in 
given cases’ (Dewey 1939, p. 47). The question of value and valuation is therefore not some 
abstract contemplation, but a very concrete element of social order and coordination. The 
stabilised relations of ends and means then constitute the fabric of social life as they are 
continuously reproduced and transformed in social practice. 
How can we relate the continuum of means and ends back to the analysis of social 
innovations? If we conceive the references of social innovations in Dewey’s terms as 
regulative frameworks made up of specific relations of means and ends, we can follow the 
specifics of different single and multi-referencing innovations. Dewey himself provides a 
short illustration for the case of the economy: 
‘The generalized ideal and standard of economy-efficiency which operates in every advanced art and 
technology is equivalent, upon analysis, to the conception of means that are constituents of ends attained and 
of ends that are usable as means to further ends.’ (ibid., p. 50) 
This shows that even single-referencing innovations such as those found in the economy are 
not isolated means or even final ends. The generalised reference of economic efficiency 
dominates the valuation of innovations, both in their outcome and function. But this ideal 
simultaneously depends on innovations as a means of generating profit. If we stop viewing 
economic efficiency as isolated from the means of attaining it, the continuum of ends and 
means highlights the inseparable fusion of both as a relatively stable referential framework in 
the economy. Thus, it is not simply economic efficiency, but enhancing efficiency through 
innovative, i.e. creative, action which provides the basic reference structure for valuating. 
This might seem tautological in an economic context, since pursuing efficiency at all costs is 
an inherent contradiction and can thus hardly be an end in itself. Only when we strictly 
separate economic efficiency from other references does the monetary aspect become 
dominant. 
The case becomes even more complex if we consider multi-referencing social 
innovations. If we see social innovations not as simple means, but as bundles of means and 
ends-in-view, we have to relate them to the specific reference structures of the fields within 
which they occur. Some fields, like the economy, science and the arts, have an inherent bias 
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towards novelty and change, whereas other fields, such a religion, typically take a more 
conservative stance. In fields with more conservative reference structures, social innovations 
might actually be employed in order to maintain a specific order – like in the case of 
Bismarck’s social legislation, which was introduced to maintain the established political 
power structure (cf. Gillwald 2000). Diverging abstract ends, from creative destruction to the 
conservation of order, present different reference structures in which means and ends-in-view 
are combined. Consequently, this turns the analysis of the multiple references of social 
innovations into an empirical question guided by the analytical premise not to disassociate 
means and ends. But analysing how specific social innovations mesh with or oppose the 
existing reference structures is only one relevant aspect. On a larger scale, we can also 
conceive of social innovations as transforming the very reference structures that shape them. 
For instance, the OECD move towards sustainable consumption can be viewed as a social 
innovation which actively seeks to combine divergent reference structures from the economy, 
consumerism and politics. In this case, the durable reconfiguration of means and ends-in-view 
is the social innovation. This adds a new layer to the discussion of single or multiple 
referencing innovations because the frames of reference themselves are being addressed. 
From Dewey’s theory of valuation, the analysis of social innovations must target multiple 
references in terms of ends and means. This creates a complex analytical framework which 
targets the relations and references of social innovations (Rammert 2010). The relations ‘old 
and new’, ‘useful and useless’ are always embedded in referential systems (economic, 
political, etc.). Yet these systems are composed of temporarily stabilised means-end 
relationships. Therefore, these references do not finally determine the questions of what is 
‘new’ and ‘useful’, but they are themselves subject to changes in the means-ends relations. 
Both relations and references of social innovations are continuously being tested, questioned 
and re-evaluated in terms of means and ends. 
After the two main conceptual considerations concerning the reflexivities and references 
of social innovations so far, the last part of this report will empirically outline how social 
innovations are discussed in the realm of EU politics today. Since the peak of social 
innovations around the 1970s (visible in the Google Ngram search in figure 1), there seems to 
be renewed interest in the concept today, not just from the academic side, but increasingly 
also from politics. This would suggest that social innovations are now becoming a valuable 
(sic!) instrument in the political toolbox of the innovation society. Following the conceptual 
discussion, the empirical questions which remains is, if and how an increasing use of social 
innovations as means of social change in turn transforms the ends they are supposed to 
achieve. A full analysis of this topic would warrant a paper in its own right and cannot be 
provided in the present context, but a brief glance at some official European programs for 
social innovation helps to sketch out their reflexivities and references. As a matter of fact, it 
will be shown how the political use of the term ‘social innovation’ itself is the artefact of an 
innovation process promoted by an initiative of think tanks and social scientists in on the level 
of EU policy. 
 
6. Social innovation initiatives and institutions in the EU 
 
Social innovations are increasingly discussed in political, scientific and economic arenas. For 
instance, the issue received a prominent position on the EU agenda in recent years, which is in 
itself an indicator for the increasing reflexivity of social innovations. Moreover, the political 
programmes are framed within a distinct set of references. They mainly draw on the 
established notion of techno-economic innovations and propose social innovations as 
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solutions for increasing economic wealth, but also political participation, equality and cost 
containment. This overview is divided into reports, initiatives and competitions with a brief 
outlook on social innovation agencies. These are not separate entities or events, but rather 
resemble a close-knit network of social innovation entrepreneurs that link practitioners with 
research and political institutions. 
 
Report: The Open Book on Social Innovation 
The Open Book on Social Innovation (OBSI) published in 2010 by Murray et al. on behalf of 
the Young Foundation and the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts 
sketches out political, civil and economic engagements with social innovation by framing 
them as: 
‘the many ways in which people are creating new and more effective answers to the biggest challenges of 
our times: how to cut our carbon footprint; how to keep people healthy; and how to end poverty’ (ibid., p. 
2). 
The OBSI serves as a resource and reference for many EU social innovation initiatives and it 
frames social innovations by stressing two major deficiencies. First, concrete social needs are 
not being met by today’s policy. Social innovations are regarded as potential solutions for 
pressing societal challenges from climate change to health issues and poverty. Social 
innovations are thus regarded as Ogburn-type innovations which help to decrease tensions and 
inequalities arising out of the maladjustments and unintended consequences of modern 
societies – either the inability of classic political or market instruments to deal with complex 
societal challenges or the lack of resources to pursue social innovations on the part of the civil 
sector. And in this way, social innovations are framed as instrumental means with which to 
achieve the ends of reducing global warming and ensuring health as well as prosperity. This 
instrumental view of social innovation creates a close link with common understandings of 
economical and technical innovations as ways of being ‘new’ and ‘effective’. The close 
relation of social innovations with other innovations is further delineated in the OBSI by 
relating these innovations to fields like science and medicine, where innovation is supposedly 
better understood and mastered. Social innovations are thus assumed to include a transfer of 
innovation-related knowledge from these fields to the social, i.e. civil, realm. This conception 
essentially portrays social innovations as ‘innovations that are social both in their ends and in 
their means’ (ibid., p. 3). The main challenge for social innovations compared to other forms 
of innovation (i.e. in medicine or science) is that they cannot draw on a large corpus of 
knowledge, cases and methods. This brings us to the second deficiency, the deficiency of 
knowledge. In short, there is purportedly a lack of reflexive knowledge about social 
innovations which effectively impedes the instrumental or political use of social innovations 
despite their prevalence in society: 
‘There [in medicine, science and business, C.S.] are strong institutions and many people whose job requires 
them to be good at taking ideas from inception to impact. There is little comparable in the social field, 
despite the richness and vitality of social innovation’ (ibid., p. 2). 
This of course strongly resembles Ogburn’s idea of a lag. Other societal fields such as 
medicine, science and business accelerate growth through successful innovations, while the 
civil sector lags behind due to a lack of institutionalised innovation practices. 
The dual deficiency identified in the OBSI at the same time frames social innovations as 
both solution and a problem. Whereas they are supposed to provide a solution for manifold 
societal challenges, there also is a need for a better understanding of concrete methods and 
application cases. As a solution, the general references of social innovations are clearly 
defined as novel and effective social means for attaining relevant social ends, specifically: 
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‘new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs and create new social 
relationships or collaborations. In other words, they are innovations that are both good for society and 
enhance society’s capacity to act’ (ibid., p. 3). 
Purely economic references are exchanged for abstract societal concepts, thus creating an 
overarching frame of reference which can include a multitude of sub-references for individual 
social innovations. As a solution, social innovations are clearly marked as means to an end. 
As a problem, however, social innovations are being transformed into an end in and of 
themselves. The supposedly insufficient knowledge base for social innovations indicates that 
social innovations may not yet have become fully reflexive instruments of social change. The 
OBSI itself can be seen as an effort to increase and collect reflexive knowledge about social 
innovations and to reinsert this knowledge into society. The means are temporarily assigned 
an ends status, because the ‘existing structures and policies have found it impossible to crack 
some of the most pressing issues of our times’ (ibid., p. 3). This status is supposed to hold 
until sufficient reflexive knowledge on social innovations has been gained. 
The OBSI can thus be read as a general text for legitimising the concept of social 
innovations in the political realm. And the concrete references spelled out for social 
innovations more or less target specific issues at stake in politics (ibid., pp. 3):  
 First, the inherent complexity of current societal problems and the failure of classic 
policy and market instruments. 
 Second, rising costs in many fields from medicine to the environment and the inability 
to implement successful countermeasures to reduce these costs. 
 Third, the continued dominance of state-oriented centrally and hierarchically 
controlled methods which neglect the innovativeness of local actors. 
The general failure of the state and market to solve pressing societal problems thus calls for 
an increase in social innovations, which, at the same time entails a shift in responsibility from 
the state to local actors in a novel ‘social economy’. This perspective ‘handles complexity not 
by standardisation and simplification imposed from the centre, but by distributing complexity 
to the margins – to the local managers and workers on the shop floor, as well as to the 
consumers themselves’ (ibid., p. 5). The reflexive knowledge to be generated is also outlined 
(ibid., pp. 6), for example: there need to be better metrics for evaluating the success of social 
innovations, more favourable organisational forms in which they can be conducted and more 
integrative coalitions and networks, since social innovations typically evolve through 
cooperation among different organisations. We can see that the reflexivities and references of 
social innovations are equally addressed to form a package that proposes social innovations as 
potent means for creating solutions to pressing problems (cf. the innovation lifecycle, ibid., 
pp. 12). In a way, the OBSI is concerned with politically innovating of the concept of social 
innovation itself. 
 
Report: Study on Social Innovation 
The 2010 Study on Social Innovation (SoSI)
5
 is quite similar to the OBSI and was prepared by 
the Social Innovation eXchange and the Young Foundation as an overview for the Bureau of 
European Policy Advisors in the European Commission. It identifies six societal challenges 
facing the EU in the 21st century: economic growth, unemployment, climate change, ageing 
demographics, social exclusion, and public sector innovation. Social innovations are seen as 
part of a novel innovation paradigm, which presents a contrast to the common understanding 
                                                 
5 http://youngfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Study-on-Social-Innovation-for-the-Bureau-of-
European-Policy-Advisors-March-2010.pdf 
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of innovations as ‘push’ models driven by R&D. The SoSI frames social innovations as an 
emerging and heterogeneous field of social change which to a large extent is still poorly 
understood. Like the OBSI, social innovations are defined as ‘innovations that are social both 
in their ends and in their means’ (SoSI, pp. 17). 
 
Report: Empowering people, driving change 
The Bureau of European Policy Advisors also published the report Empowering people, 
driving change: Social innovation in the European Union
6
 in 2010, which is strongly linked 
with the SoSI. It specifies the EU perspective on social innovations, which largely reflects 
that of the OBSI and SoSI: The societal challenges of migration, unemployment, poverty, 
aging and climate change are putting increasing stress on EU policy to find cost-effective 
solutions in times of budgetary constraints. The report briefly sums up these problems and 
premises: 
‘Firstly, solutions must be found, in a time of major budgetary constraints, to deliver better services making 
more effective use of available resources. Second, the traditional ways in which the market, the public and 
the civil sector have provided answers to social demands are no longer sufficient. In this context, social 
innovation represents an important option, to be enhanced at different levels (local, regional, national, 
European) and sectors (public, private, civil) as its purpose is to innovate in a different way (through the 
active engagement of society itself) and to generate primarily social value.’ (ibid., p. 30). 
 
Report: The European Commission Guide to Social Innovation 
The most recent report is the Guide to Social Innovation
7
 published in 2013 by the European 
Commission DG Regional and Urban Policy and DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion. The report basically takes up the topics of the three previously mentioned reports 
and provides examples of social innovation funded by EU Structural Funds (ESF and ERDF). 
It also aims at strengthening social innovation as a topic for the Structural Funds for the years 
2014-2020. 
 
Initiative: Social Innovation Europe 
The Social Innovation Europe (SIE) initiative ran for two years from January 2011 until 
December 2012. It connected multiple actors including the Euclid Network, the Danish 
Technological Institute, and the Young Foundation. It was led by the Social Innovation 
eXchange and funded by the European Commission’s DG Enterprise and Industry. The SIE 
significantly draws on OBSI, which is evident from prominent citations of the OBSI on its 
website and the involvement of the Young Foundation in both the SIE and OBSI. If the OBSI 
was the kickoff, then the SIE ‘represents a major effort to build and streamline the social 
innovation field in Europe’8 by connecting the relevant actors through the initiative and ‘to 
create a streamlined, vigorous social innovation field in Europe, to raise a shared voice, and to 
propel Europe to lead the practice of social innovation globally.’9 The SIE’s activities include 
the publication of reports, launching an Internet presence (www.socialinnovationeurope.eu) 
and organising events. SIE reports such as Strengthening Social Innovation in Europe. 
Journey to effective assessment and metrics discuss the ways in which social innovations 
should be evaluated as effective instruments for social change. The four dimensions of 
                                                 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/social_innovation.pdf 
7 http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/10157/47822/Guide%20to%20Social%20Innovation.pdf 
8 SIE report ‘Strengthening social innovation in Europe’, 2012, p. 6. 
9 Ibid. 
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assessment are the strategic fit, the impacts on outcome, efficiency, and potential for 
implementation (p. 13). This again stresses a highly instrumental concept of social 
innovations, should they receive public funding. This instrumental perspective is also closely 
related to cost-cutting issues. Social innovations are increasingly discussed under the 
conditions of rising expenditures and strict financial limits. Another report, Financing Social 
Impact. Funding social innovation in Europe – mapping the way forward complements this 
view and reframes the basic problems already proposed in the OBSI: 
‘But it [social innovation, C.S.] lacks the systematic and sophisticated infrastructures of support available to 
other fields – in particular, access to appropriate finance and funding. The result is that although there is no 
shortage of good ideas, far too few actually achieve the impact they could.’ (p. 6). 
The final summary Social Innovation Europe. January 2011 – December 2012 reiterated this 
point and stressed the need to connect the abundance of innovative activities at the communal 
level with higher-level political infrastructures and funding. This need for Systemic 
Innovation was also stressed in a third report, which centred on the shift from linear to 
networked modes of innovation and systems of innovation. Networked modes of innovation 
pose distinct problems to the governance of innovations and the systems approach situates 
each innovation in a rich institutional and cultural context. Both perspectives lead to the 
insight that ‘systemic innovation in general is difficult to orchestrate or support’ (p. 12). 
The three SIE Reports Financing Social Impact, Strengthening Social Innovation and 
Systemic Innovation, together with the website www.socialinnovationeurope.eu and the SIE 
events resulted in ten recommendations which were submitted to the European Commission: 
 
1) Creating a common vision and better system in order to align actors, interests and 
strategies by providing a shared definition of social innovations. 
2) Creating a shared intelligence by standardising the understandings of social 
innovations and mapping the European social innovation efforts. 
3) Greater experimentation triggered through the creation of opportunities and spaces for 
experimentation where innovation can also be systematically observed. 
4) Investing in research and innovation, i.e. creating the relevant reflexive knowledge for 
establishing social innovations on a systemic level. 
5) Developing enabling conditions through regulation, legislation and, especially, 
financing. 
6) Facilitating rapid learning between the heterogeneous innovative agencies and policy 
makers, especially facilitating user-led modes of evaluation. 
7) Better metrics for creating not only reflexive but systematic knowledge to provide 
policy makers with a reliable knowledge infrastructure. 
8) Stimulating/incentivising innovation through challenges and prizes, results-based 
remuneration and focussing public procurement on social innovations. 
9) Incubation of social innovations so that they can grow in size to match large-scale 
pressing social problems. 
10) Building capacities and supporting and growing networks, especially initiatives like 
SIX and SIE enable local knowledge to be transferred and scaled to the European level 
and help to create the necessary common understanding of social innovations. 
 
The ten recommendations highlight the perceived lack of reflexive knowledge and the 
underdeveloped references for social innovations from an EU perspective. The gap between 
local initiatives and EU agencies is mainly framed as an inability of large-scale politics to tap 
into the heterogeneous creative and innovative resources as well as an inability of local 
initiatives to tap into the grand EU funding schemes. The SIE suggests that metrics for 
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measurement and systematic, reflexive knowledge about social innovations, together with 
funding of social innovation networks and stimulating innovative activities themselves, will 
help to transfer successful local innovations to a larger European scale and, last not least, 
provide some solutions to pressing social problems, especially: climate change, chronic 
disease, social exclusion and material poverty. The SIE also proposes these problems as four 
major references for social innovations at the EU level. 
 
Initiative: Challenge Social Innovation 
So far, the discussion shows that there are many challenges to be overcome before social 
innovations may actually be implemented as solutions on a larger political scale. The 
conference Challenge Social Innovation (CSI, www.socialinnovation2011.eu) addressed this 
issue by pointing out that innovations in many societal fields and on many levels will become 
an important feature of concerted European action and EU policy. The conference focussed 
on the scientific analysis of social innovation with the intent to make existing social 
innovation research in the social sciences and the humanities more available to practitioners 
around the globe. Again, the need for the creation of reflexive knowledge was stated in the 
results of the conference, namely ‘to raise awareness of different approaches and of the need 
to foster common theoretical and methodological grounds for internationally comparable, 
reliable and applicable research in social innovation.’ The conference also produced the 
Vienna Declaration (VD), in which the most relevant topics in social innovation research 
were formulated. These topics are viewed to emerge out of the transition from industrial to 
knowledge- and service-based societies, which can no longer rely on technical innovation 
alone. As a solution, the declaration calls for a new innovation paradigm, which is ‘essentially 
characterised by the opening of the innovation process to society. Alongside companies, 
universities and research institutes, citizens and customers become relevant actors of 
innovation processes’ (VD, p. 2). In order to understand and utilise this new paradigm, the 
VD aims to strengthen and focus scientific research on social innovations in Europe by 
specifying scientific requirements and research topics as well as setting up concrete research 
collaborations. Thus, the reflexive knowledge concerning social innovations is predominantly 
formulated as scientific knowledge for the benefit of both practitioners and politicians. It 
should also be noted that the CSI conference as well as the VD are instruments for 
strengthening not only social innovations as such, but also to enhance social innovation 
research in the social sciences and humanities, for instance within the EU’s Seventh 
Framework Programme for Research, which strongly focuses on technical innovation. 
 
Initiative: Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Foundations for Social Innovation in 
Europe 
The Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Foundations for Social Innovation in Europe 
(TEPSIE, www.tepsie.eu) is such a programme funded through FP 7 under the topic ‘New 
innovation processes including Social Innovation’ which began in January 2012 and will 
continue for a period of three years. It is a scientific consortium aimed at preparing ‘the way 
for developing the tools, methods and policies which will be part of the EU strategy for social 
innovation’ (TEPSIE website). 
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Initiative: Employment and Social Innovation 
Social innovations are now also increasingly integrated into EU funding schemes. For 
instance, the EU programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI)
10
 holds a proposed 
budget of €815 million for the years 2014 to 2020. It is aimed at integrating and extending the 
coverage of three existing programmes: PROGRESS (Programme for Employment and Social 
Solidarity), EURES (European Employment Services) and the European Progress 
Microfinance Facility. According to the press release ‘EaSI will enable the Commission to 
increase policy coherence and impact of its instruments, which have common objectives, thus 
contributing to the Europe 2020 Strategy for Jobs and Growth’. Thus, EaSI will become a 
central programme within the EU Initiative for Employment and Social Inclusion running 
from 2014 to 2020. 
 
Competition: This is European Social Innovation 
Early social innovation initiatives often take the form of competitions. In 2010, This is 
European Social Innovation was aimed at accessing and evaluating social innovation projects 
from all over Europe. Out of more than one hundred proposals, ten were chosen according to 
three criteria: usefulness, meaning for those involved and creating new and effective 
relationships in society. 
 
Competition: International Social Innovation Competition: Naples 2.0 
A second practical step towards fusing social innovations and EU policy was taken in a model 
competition geared towards various social challenges in the city of Naples in 2011
11
. It was 
organised by the Euclid Network around six pre-defined challenges:  1) turning a confiscated 
Camorra villa into a social enterprise, 2) making the abandoned Roman bath of Fuorigrotta 
accessible, 3) designing a new business model for the volunteering organisation Gioco 
Immagine e Parole, 4) designing a new business model for Maestri Di Strada which re-
integrates school drop-outs, 5) developing a new method to integrate the Roma community of 
Scampia and 6) developing an effective methodology for recycling textile (this challenge had 
no winner). In contrast to the This is European Social Innovation competition, the awards 
were granted not to successfully functioning projects, but to promising candidates who had 
developed proposals for pressing and pre-defined societal challenges in order to evaluate how 
social innovations can be directed at specific social problems. 
 
Competition: European Social Innovation Competition 
In 2012, a third competition was set up for novel ways of dealing with work opportunities 
(www.socialinnovationcompetition.eu). In May 2013, €20,000 grants were awarded to three 
proposals: the first proposed specific measures to extend the reach and impact of sustainable, 
small-scale social care and health services; the second, improvements in job market access for 
the economically deprived by making their skills widely visible; and the third, reductions in 
youth unemployment achieved through job sharing among younger and older employees. The 
next round of the competition is scheduled for 2014. 
 
 
                                                 
10 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-628_en.htm 
11 http://www.euclidnetwork.eu/projects/current-projects/european-social-innovation-naples-20.html 
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Agencies and institutions 
In addition to the initiatives and competitions, a number of dedicated social innovation 
agencies are actively advancing this topic.
12
 The London-based Young Foundation (YF, 
youngfoundation.org), for instance, initiated the now independent Social Innovation 
eXchange (SIX, www.socialinnovationexchange.org). The Foundation is also currently 
involved in TEPSIE; its past activities include involvement in the SIE, as well as content-
related work on the OBSI and SoSI. The Young Foundation is an influential intermediary in 
the process of putting social innovation on the political agenda, i.e. in politically innovating 
the idea of social innovation itself. On the continent, the Centre for Social Innovation (ZSI, 
www.zsi.at) in Vienna co-organised the CSI and is part of the European School of Social 
Innovation. Many more such intermediary agencies exist but will not be listed here. The main 
point about these social innovation agencies is that they are, like the YF, reflexive agents for 
not only promoting social innovations at the grassroots level, but also for politically 
promoting the concept of social innovation as both a solution and a challenge for European 
policy in the 21st century. They also aim to provide a reflexive knowledge base and a suitable 
valuation metric for identifying promising social innovation projects and the mechanisms for 
growing them from their local contexts to larger scales, quintessentially connecting 
practitioners with researchers and politicians, i.e. local ideas with systematic knowledge and 
potent funding. 
This reflexive creation of social innovation as a central topic for European societies and 
European policy is of course in itself an interesting case of social innovation. The current 
status of social innovations for EU policy makers is still that of somewhat ‘hopeful monsters’ 
in evolutionary terms, i.e. ‘monsters which would start a new evolutionary line if fitting into 
some empty environmental niche.’ (Goldschmidt 1933: 547). The empty environmental niche 
for social innovations is seen to open up through the shift from industrial societies relying on 
techno-economic innovations to knowledge or service-oriented societies, which increasingly 
rely on more open and complex models of innovation for growth as well as cost containment. 
This niche also emerges through a growing awareness of the failings of the state and the 
market to address post-industrial challenges. Social innovations themselves have been around 
for much longer, but now seems the time to reflexively build on this niche and provide for the 
growth of concept of social innovations. Because social innovations are simultaneously 
viewed as ‘hopeful’ and ‘monstrous’, intermediary agencies like the YF supply a dual 
legitimation, for instance in the TEPSI definition of social innovations (Young Foundation 
2012). On the one hand, social innovations hold clearly hopeful promise: 
‘Social innovation has also emerged as a response to growing social, environmental and demographic 
challenges – often called ‘wicked’ problems because they are complex, multi-faceted, involve a range of 
stakeholders and are, by their nature, impossible to solve. These challenges are numerous but include, the 
‘failure’ of the modern welfare state, the failure of conventional market capitalism, resource scarcity and 
climate change, an ageing population and the associated care and health costs, the impact of globalisation, 
the impact of mass urbanisation and so on.’ (ibid., p. 5) 
On the other hand, they are ‘monstrous’ due to their lack of overall cohesion and systematic 
knowledge: 
‘The boundaries around social innovation boundaries are so vague and ill defined that it is probably more 
appropriate to talk of social innovation ‘literatures’ than one distinct and unified body of knowledge.’ (ibid., 
p. 4) 
In order to create a new evolutionary line, i.e. the transformation of social innovation into a 
new paradigm for large-scale EU funding, the monstrosity of social innovation needs to be 
addressed and ameliorated in two ways: First, innovations must be more scalable in order to 
                                                 
12 A European directory can be found here: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/socialinnovationeurope/directory 
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achieve a broader impact and, second, a more systematic and reflexive knowledge base is 
required. Agencies like YF serve as locales for channelling both the hopefulness as well as the 
monstrosity of social innovations and as such they become important agencies in civil society, 
academic discourse and political decision-making processes. 
The EU social innovation initiatives, competitions and reports discussed above clearly show 
the increasingly reflexive manner of engaging with social innovations. If we distinguish 
between the pragmatic, the grammatical and the semantic levels of social innovations (Hutter 
et al. 2011), we can also see differences between them. On the pragmatic level, the level of 
concrete social innovation activities, an abundance of social innovations can be identified 
throughout Europe and in several different fields. Reports like the OBSI and SoSI, as well as 
initiatives like SIE or CSI, emphasise the richness of the pragmatic level and, at the same 
time, contribute to an increased prominence on the semantic level. In contrast, what seems to 
be most obviously lacking on the EU scale is the grammatical level of systematic organisation 
and funding for social innovations. The reports and initiatives unanimously state that while 
the grammar of economic and technical innovations is rather well researched and understood, 
knowledge about the grammar of social innovations is still sorely lagging. Initial steps can be 
undertaken in this direction by collaborating to develop a shared understanding of social 
innovations based on a distinct set of references, for instance: novelty, effectiveness, 
sustainability, and the satisfaction of social needs as well as the empowerment of beneficiaries 
(Young Foundation 2012, pp. 18). Whereas the first three characteristics can also be used to 
describe a narrow definition of techno-economic innovations, the latter specify distinct 
references of social innovations. 
    
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper did not endeavour to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature and 
phenomenon of social innovation (see Howaldt/Jacobsen 2010 for a broader discussion). 
Instead, its aim was to relate concepts and ideas related to social innovation to questions of an 
emerging ‘innovation society’ (Hutter et al. 2011), i.e. a society where innovation has become 
a dominant and pervasive phenomenon. The argument was elaborated in three steps. First, the 
term social innovation was distinguished from a narrow notion of techno/economic 
innovation (section 2) and a broad understanding of social change (section 3). The second 
step consisted of relating the concept of social innovation to questions of an increased 
reflexivity (section 4) and multiple references (chapter 5) of social innovations against the 
backdrop of an innovation society. The third and final step followed recent activities 
concerning social innovations on an EU scale (section 6) and related them to the previously 
discussed questions of increasing reflexivity and multi-referentiality. 
The reflexivities of social innovations were subdivided into fundamental reflexivity, 
reflexivity of social order and reflexivity of consequences. We can see that reflexivity of social 
order plays an important role with respect to social innovation activities in the EU. The failure 
of traditional state and market structures created an increased reflexive awareness of their 
inability to provide adequate solutions for current societal problems. Thus, the established 
social order of industrial societies gave way to novel societal forms such as knowledge or 
service-oriented societies. The idea of an innovation society results from the reflexive 
monitoring of this shift and proposes a novel (social) innovation paradigm which better fits 
growing demands for more effective social change and improved cost containment. 
Essentially, the reflexive monitoring of social order in an innovation society is not 
predominantly oriented towards stability, but towards change and the scaling up of local 
solutions to regional, national or even international levels, i.e. the diffusion of innovations. 
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Academic research is of course a dominant source of such reflexive knowledge and the 
innovation-oriented EU social research programmes further the expertise on changing social 
problems and a fragile social order. Social innovations have clearly increased on the level of 
reflexive social order. This increase concerns at least three different aspects: first, an increase 
in concrete social innovation activities; second, an increase in systematic knowledge about 
social innovations; and third, a shift in governance and funding structures promoting social 
innovations. 
So far, it seems too early to comment on the reflexivity of consequences concerning social 
innovations. If we follow the arguments made within the EU initiatives, control structures still 
need to be built around social innovations before they can (even start to) get ‘out-of-control’. 
Put differently, social innovations are still too ineffective on the EU level so as to warrant 
assumptions about the reflexivity of their consequences. The questions which needs to be 
answered is whether social innovations actually contribute to an out-of-control ‘juggernaut’ 
(Giddens 1990, p. 139) of modernity or if they are at least partial solutions for regaining the 
reigns. The former would be the case if the heterogeneity and local specifics of social 
innovations would result in further societal complexity and promote fragmentation over 
integration. The latter might be achieved if social innovations provide the means for 
controlling and directing social change, as well as solving pressing problems. Like all 
innovations, social innovations are ‘hopeful monsters’ to begin with, and only their 
development and their consequences determine how they will be evaluated. 
The multiple references of social innovations pose further difficulties when it comes to 
their evaluation. Conceiving social innovations as Ogburn-type innovations which decrease 
the tensions between differentiated yet misaligned social spheres associates less strongly with 
growth, i.e. the main reference of Schumpeter-type innovations. However, it does emphasise 
how they might balance divergent social interests. Especially when social innovations are 
targeted at specific societal challenges, they predominantly become a means of repair: they 
are supposed to close a gap created by technical or economic innovation and the ensuing 
cultural lag. When societies move from the industrial innovation paradigm which Ogburn had 
in mind toward a more pervasive innovation paradigm which permeates nearly all societal 
fields, we could assume an increase in lags through an increase in innovations. The reflexive 
consequences of such a shift, again, have not yet developed and thus are difficult to estimate. 
Here it can only be emphasised that innovations not only refer to invention and creative 
destruction, but also to the durable stabilisation of novel arrangements. 
Even if we cannot predict the impact and consequences of increasingly reflexive social 
innovations, we can analyse their increasing reflexivity in terms of changing means-ends 
relations. As means of social change, social innovations make specific societal futures more 
probable than others and, in this way, shape the ends to which they are employed. Such a 
performative agency could be of greater significance than the direct or indirect consequences 
of specific social innovations. The study of social innovations is always a study of change and 
contestation, in which means and ends are critically valuated by interested parties. And even 
if social innovations cannot deliver the promises which are attached to them, we can see them 
as important new locales for the negotiation and enforcements of different social interests. 
Thus, they become relevant and competitive sites of social inclusion and exclusion within an 
emerging innovation society. 
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